

Definitive account of the start of the Overland Campaign...
A Civil War battle book of the highest caliber.
Best military history of a Civil War battle

Overland Campaign "calm before the storm"...We start where "The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse" left off with both armies entrenched before the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. Rhea discusses the thinking of both Generals Lee and Grant as each labors to decide what to do next. Another unsuccessful attack at the salient is orchestrated by Grant before he makes the first move by deciding to disengage and manuever Lee out of his trenches. He advances Winfield Hancock to the southeast with the idea of using him as bait to get Lee to follow. This strategy works as Lee starts his army southward toward the North Anna river. Troop movements and lost opportunities dominate this portion of the book as Grant and Lee engage on the next portion of the campaign. Cavalry battles also are covered at this point as Union General Philip Sheridan drives the Federal cavalry on a threatening movement towards the Confederate capital at Richmond. Rhea then discusses how this movement, although somewhat successful, ultimately hurt the Union cause.
Lee then wins the race to the North Anna by taking advantage of Grant's lack of intelligence that Sheridan's cavalry would have provided. He (Lee) then entrenches south of the river as he waits to see what Grant will do. The battles at Henagan's Redoubt and Jericho Mills (both Union victories in the maneuver to the North Anna) set the stage for the highlight of the book which is the defensive posture that Lee now incorporates. Rhea shows how Confederate chief field engineer Martin Smith "proposes an ingenious solution" that results in the famous inverted "V" entrenchment below the river. This fortification has the added advantage of splitting Grant's army below the river and (if Grant attacks) would give Lee a stunning victory. Grant initiates offensive probes and becomes increasingly concerned that his troops are trapped. The little known battle at Ox Ford on the North Anna is the final proof that he needs. Lee meanwhile becomes ill and fails to delegate to his subordinates his instinctive thought to attack and the opportunity is lost. Rhea ties all this together with some of his best writing to date: "Lee had slept little in the twenty harrowing days since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. He often worked after midnight and was generally awake by 3:00 A.M. Dysentery was endemic in the Army of Norhtern Virginia, and Lee had contracted the illness by the time he had reached the North Anna. Normally even-tempered and robust, he was now irritable and rode in a carriage. On the afternoon of May 24 Lee was seized with violent intestinal distress and his aide pronounced him 'quite unwell'. The Confederate commander lay confined to his tent, 'prostrated by his sickness' with a single thought dominating his mind 'We must strike a blow'. But the Army of Northern Virginia could not strike a blow. It required a firm hand to coordinate so complex an undertaking. In better times, when Jackson and Longstreet commanded the wings of the Confederate army, Lee had liberally delegated responsibility. But Jackson was dead and Longstreet disabled and Lee lacked confidence in their successors." Grant then realizes the danger of his position and extricates his forces to the Northern side of the river. His decision to maneuver again "by the left flank" to the southeast closes out the text portion of the book.
Rhea then ends the book with an excellent Epilogue section in which he discusses the heretofore unknown battle at Wilson's Wharf on the James River showing for the first time the fighting tenacity of the Federal's black troops and also whereby he draws conclusions that differ somewhat with the contemporary standard: "Historians have considered Lee's inability to attack on the afternoon of May 24 a lost opportunity of major proportions. In retrospect, it is doubtful that even a healthy Lee could have dealt a decisive blow. He would most certainly have wrecked much of Hancock's corps, but he would have lacked the strength and time to exploit the localized victory. Nightfall would likely have prevented him from crossing the North Anna. Grant could take severe casualties in stride. Terrible subtractions in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House did not deter him, nor did severe losses at Cold Harbor in the coming weeks. It is difficult to imagine Hancock's defeat inducing him to abandon his campaign. Sickness doubtless cost Lee a superb opportunity to damage an isolated portion of Grant's army at the North Anna River, but the lost opportunity should not be exaggerated. Judging from Grant's reaction to earlier and later setbacks, he likely would have treated defeat at the North Anna as a tactical reverse and gone on with his campaign."
Judiciously written and masterfully researched (Rhea discloses in the Introduction that little of any substance has been written on this period due to the confusing state of exisiting material), Gordon Rhea has created (in my opinion) another masterpiece, further fortifying his standing as one of the outstanding contemporary Civil War historians. I give this book a very high recommendation.
To the North Anna River: A Necessary BridgeRhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.
For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.
To The North Anna River, Grant and Lee May 13-25, 1864Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.
The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.
The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."
Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.


Rhea's World
Slice-of-Jewish life Essays

GOOD BOOK
Wild Notion filled with romance and suspense...
Wild Notion is a wild ride that ends in . . .

Cold Harbor as campaign history...Even though this period does encompass a significant amount of maneuvering, cavalry battles, small infantry engagements and entrenchments, Rhea, as in his previous works, feels obligated to discuss all of it in detail. While he does accomplish an amazingingly organized study of this amazingly complex series of movements, he loses many a reader to these details and ultimately the whole book suffers somewhat in terms of quality.
This isn't to say that this is a bad book...on the contrary, as I've previously stated, Rhea presents an impressive study, taking no liberties in his research to uncover what really happened and when. We start out with the armies facing each other at the North Anna river. U.S. Grant, having realized that R.E. Lee's inverted "V" entrenchment south of the river is indeed a trap, decides to again move "by the left flank" and steals a march on Lee by crossing the Pamunkey river with his sights set on Richmond. Lee finally discovers this and sets up strong defenses along Totopotomoy creek between Grant and Richmond. Cavalry battles at Haw's Shop/Enon Church, Bethesda Church and Matadequin Creek presage the infantry "skirmishes" along Shady Grove Road and Old Church Road.
Then "a fateful cascade of events had brought Cold Harbor to the forefront Grant's and Lee's attention. Federal commanders initially had no intention of using the place in their offensive operations. They considered the road junction significant only because Confederates might exploit it as a staging area to harass Union supply lines and thwart (Union General Baldy) Smith's arrival." Lee, sensing Grant's intention to capture the crossrads and use it as a launching pad for an invasion of Richmond, sends Cavalry to Cold Harbor to prevent them from taking it. Union Cavalry under Phil Sheridan fears that the Confederates plan to attack him there and goes on the offensive. Lee conversely thinks that the Cavalry attack is the vanguard for a major Union attack and shifts an entire infantry corps there. Grant sees this and starts his infantry there and the engagement is on.
The famous confrontations on June 1st and 3rd mark the true battles at Cold Harbor and Rhea hits his stride in discussing them: "Writers later alluded to a 'Cold Harbor' syndrome, claiming that the carnage Union soldiers witnessed in the fighting there persuaded them to shy away from assaulting entrenched positions. In fact, by the time the Army of the Potomac reached Cold Harbor, veterans had already learned that valuable lesson. Cold Harbor is where newcomers discovered what old timers already knew." Famous engagements involving the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery and the 8th New York Heavy Artillery are detailed here making these stories a remarkable companion for the History Channel's "Civil War Combat" episode on Cold Harbor. These army-wide assaults against the entrenched Confederate positions have driven many historians to indict Grant for mis-management of this battle and garnering him the reputation of a "butcher". Rhea dispels these myths: "When viewed in the war's larger context, the June 3 attack falls short of it's popular reputation for slaughter. Grant lost more men each day in the Wilderness and on two different days at Spotsylvania Court House than he did on Jume 3, making his main effort at Cold Harbor only the fifth bloodiest day for the Federals since crossing the Rapidan." What Grant and the Union army is guilty of is army-wide coordination. Time and again, they have an advantage taken away when coordinated movements go awry and the Confederates are able to capitalize...Rhea documents these in his closing chapter and discusses Grant's feeling that this was not a major defeat, but just another obstacle in his road to defeating Lee's army.
A study not for the general reader, but an essential component for historians and of Civil War history, Gordon Rhea's latest book continues his impressive documantation of the close of the war in Virginia and I would encourage all Civil War buffs to read these books.
A Stand-Up Fight in an Open Field Against an Intrenched FoeThe title of my review, which comes from a quote by Lt Col Charles Cummings of the 17th Vermont, is a good description of the main battle. Cold Harbor looks forward to the grim battle lines of the First World War, where men dug in and ventured from their trenches at their peril. As the war went on, the veteran troops on both sides learned to dig in. It was the gung-ho new regiments from the North that had the heaviest casualties: They had not yet developed the basic survival skills.
Rhea's study went in for such heavy detail that at times, I yearned for an occasional editorial perspective, which this author pretty much restricted to the first and last chapters.
Robert E Lee came out relatively unsinged from Cold Harbor, but Grant has taken much of the blame for the unfortunate general staff culture of the Army of the Potomac. Remember that it was only a short time before that he took over the command, and he had to make do with prima donnas like Meade -- who comes off particularly badly -- as well as Burnside, Warren, and Wright. Even Baldy Smith, Grant's friend whom he had rescued from the country club atmosphere of Butler's command at Bermuda Hundred, spent most of the time (though somewhat justifiably) complaining about lack of food and ammunition, and contradictory commands from the top.
After I finished reading this book, I looked up Grant's own memoirs and saw an interesting bit that Rhea omits entirely: After the battle, there was an exchange of letters between Grant and Lee (which Grant quotes verbatim) in which the Union general requests a truce to collect the dead and wounded. Lee refused repeatedly, until several days later, by which time only two of the many thousands wounded left on the battlefield survived. This is a serious charge and should be addressed in any book on Cold Harbor, if only to dismiss it. Perhaps Rhea will put it in his next volume?
I was enchanted by Lee's inherent ability to create good ground for a battle by his knowledge of the countryside and his superior relationship to his staff officers. He was for certain a formidable and great adversary. Grant, on his side, was walking on eggshells. The nominating convention to select a candidate to run against Lincoln was about to take place: A complete route of the Union forces would have led to, God save us all, a President George B. McClellan.
Cold Harborhis narrative is fairly easy to follow and to comprehend. I especially appreciated the numerous, detailed maps which did not overlook showing locations whose place names appeared in the text.


the stories have aged poorly
Typical L.M. Montgomery short stories
A very wonderful and beautiful book!

Harnessing MicroStation/J(tm)This won't replace the User or Reference Guide for MicroStation/J, you will want to keep them at hand. It does give a good second look at the basic concepts in MicroStation.
An Excellent Choice

MAravilloso libro

Good writing, great book with important insights
Now, having said all that, this is still an excellent book...one that's well worth reading for it captures the little discussed battle for the Wilderness (May, 1864) in complete and comprehensive detail. U.S. Grant's assumption of command and his initial tentative dealings with former commander George Meade are the framework that starts this book and Rhea shows how that fragmented structure was partly responsible for the Union Armies' disappointing showing in this battle. This unwieldy command structure is at first evident when Grant's plan to get R.E. Lee out in the open is thwarted by the many problems with the Widerness area itself and the lethargy of his many division commanders...they just couldn't get momentum enough to get this Army across the Rapidan River and through the Wilderness to meet Lee on the field of their choice. What resulted was that the Confederate Army was able to attack and hold at bay (indeed, almost defeat) the Federals while being greatly outnumbered.
Rhea then breaks this battle discussion down into two main parts: the "Northern" battle along the Orange Turnpike and the "Southern" battle on and around the Orange Plank Road. Division, Brigade and Company movements are analyzed in excruciating detail and it takes a lot of concentration to follow along here. Rhea does, however, summarize at the end of each chapter fairly well, so understanding the "big picture" is ultimately accomplished.
The second day's battle plan and execution follows this detailed description style, and Rhea deftly describes the apex of the battle when Longstreet's troops make their appearance (later then planned, having marched many miles from the Southwest). The hugely successful flanking attack around the Union's left flank through an unfinished railroad cut and subsequent rollback of the Federals to the Brock Road, along with John B. Gordon's flank attack along the Federal right flank at Saunders Field are the highlights of the battle and the book. The unremitting carnage is ever present throughout and Rhea does a great job in making the point that this was a major Civil War battle with major casualties. Rhea then closes out the book with brilliant conclusions and summaries (i.e. everybody gets some blame and some kudos).
This work is a very schlolarly and detailed military study and justly stands as the definitve account of the Wilderness Battle...this should be read by all Civil War historians, but may be a little much for the general reader. However, I do look forward to reading the rest of the books in this series and I would recommend this to any history buff.